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Abstract 
This paper seeks to find explanations to why land productivity is lower on land rented out by 
female landlord households than on land rented out by male landlord households. First it is 
demonstrated that this productivity differential is highly significant after controlling for land 
productivity using nearest neighbour and kernel plot matching methods. Then we test 
alternative hypotheses that possibly may explain the productivity differential. These include 
transaction costs in the land rental market, larger problem with Marshallian inefficiency on 
land rented out by female landlords, poorer ability to screen good tenants and evict bad tenant 
by female landlords, and larger proportion of pure landlords (with poorer monitoring 
capacity) among female landlords. Using GLS and controlling for sample selection we found 
evidence of Marshallian inefficiency in the analysis but this could not explain the gender 
productivity differential. Female landlords have tenants who are older, own less oxen, are 
more related, and under longer-term contracts. In the parametric regressions land productivity 
was significantly lower on plots rented out to in-law tenants and this appeared to explain the 
gender productivity differential. Female landlords may be forced to rent their land to their in-
laws and they are unable to evict them even if they are inefficient land users. Land reforms that 
strengthen women’s land rights may therefore be good for efficiency as well as equity. Recent 
land regulations restricting renting out of land to maximum half of the farm area may 
contribute to weaken women’s land rights as a large share of the poor female landlords 
currently rent out more than half of their land because they lack the necessary nonland 
resources to farm efficiently. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a common view and belief that women are the ones that do the farming in Africa while 
the men do not work much. Yet we find a lot of variation within the continent, making such 
sweeping generalisations too strong. Still, there is no doubt that men in most places have more 
power than women within their families and communities as they in most communities are 
considered to be the household head and take up most local leadership positions. When looking 
at the agricultural production both within and across households some interesting gender-
specific differences have been identified. Udry et al. found that land productivity on plots 
controlled by women was lower than that of plots controlled by men. Their study showed that 
men were more able to mobilize labour and other factors of production for their plots than 
women were within the family (Udry, et al., 1995). Another study by Udry found 30% lower 
productivity on female plots than that of male plots within households in Burkina Faso (Udry, 
1996). Goldstein and Udry attributed the productivity differential to women’s higher level of 
tenure insecurity, making them less able to invest in the land in form of fallowing because they 
could then risk losing the land (Goldstein and Udry, 2005).  
 
In Ethiopia Holden et al. (2001) found systematic lower productivity on owner-operated land of 
female-headed households than that of male-headed households (Holden, et al., 2001). Bezabih 
and Holden found lower land productivity on land of female landlords than that of male 
landlords (Bezabih and Holden, 2006). We build on and expand from the analysis of Bezabih 
and Holden (2006). They used a double moral hazard model with tenure insecurity and 
transaction costs to explain the productivity differential. Female landlord households were 
assumed to be more tenure insecure and were therefore considered less able and less likely to 
use threat of eviction and contract renewal as an instrument to enhance productivity on rented 
out land. Alternatively, female landlords faced higher transaction costs in the land rental 
markets and therefore had larger difficulties in evicting inefficient tenants and in searching and 
finding more efficient tenants.  
 
In this study we test a number of alternative models and hypotheses that possibly may explain 
the productivity differentials between female- and male-headed landlord households using the 
same data as in Bezabih and Holden (2006). First we test a simple transaction cost model for 
participation in the land rental market and its possible consequences for land productivity 
differentials. Second, we test a model with endogenous contract choice to see whether 
Marshallian inefficiency due to more limited monitoring capacity can explain the productivity 
differential. Third, we test whether the productivity differential may be explained by screening 
and/or adverse selection of tenants possibly due to female-headed households’ lower ability to 
screen and select good tenants and evict bad tenants. This could also be due to the tenure 
insecurity of female landlords, making them less able to use threats of eviction (Kassie and 
Holden 2006; Bezabih and Holden 2006). Finally, we test whether kinship contracts, involving 
blood-related tenants or in-laws of male and female landlords are less efficient, like found by 
Kassie and Holden (2006). This may be another reason for female landlords being unable to 
use threat of eviction as a device to enhance effciency. Such a finding may give reason to doubt 
that partner choice in the rental market is voluntary. Coersion may play an important part and 
possibly explain the productivity differential. We discuss whether this could be captured by a 
transaction cost model or whether a contested exchange model (Bowles and Gintis, 1988, 
Bowles and Gintis, 1993) may be more appropriate.  
 
In part 2 of the paper we provide more background information about the setting where the 
empirical study was carried out. In part 3 we present alternative theoretical models that form 
the basis for our hypothesis testing and analysis. In part 4 we give an overview of econometric 
methods used and discuss some of the limitations. Then we go to the presentation of results and 
discuss the findings in relation to our hypotheses before we conclude. 
 
2. The setting 
This study uses information from the 230 landlord households in the sample of approximately 
2000 households in two districts, East Gojjam and South Wollo, in the Amhara National 
Regional State in the northern and central highlands of Ethiopia. East Gojjam is a fertile 
plateau receiving good average rainfall, while South Wollo is characterized by degraded farm 
plots receiving lower and more erratic rainfall. An overall sample of 130 male and 100 female 
landlords is included as a result.  
 
As has been noted in the previous section, households may or may not engage in the land lease 
market, by virtue of which they are categorized as ‘autarkic’, ‘landlords’ or ‘tenants’. For those 
who engage in the land lease market as landlords, they might do so partially or fully i.e. by 
renting out all/part of the plots that belong to them. If they rent out all their land we call them 
‘pure landlords’.  
 The participation of female-headed households in the land market is restricted to the leasing-
out side of the market (Deininger , et al., 2006, Deininger, et al., 2006). Based on the same data 
set as we used they show that 40% of the households that rent out land are female-headed (our 
sample for analysis) and more than 70% of female-headed households rent out land. At the 
same time they find no significant difference in area owned between those renting-in and 
renting-out land. This demonstrates the ‘reverse-tenancy’-nature of the land rental market in 
Ethiopia, which also has been demonstrated in other studies (Holden and Ghebru, 2005, Kassie 
and Holden, 2006), and in other African countries (Bellemare, 2006, Tikabo, et al., Revised). 
 
Thus, for our purpose, our analysis focuses on male and female landlords who are among the 
poorest of the poor in the areas of study. While there are some households who lease out their 
land fully, a considerable proportion of them are owner-cum landlords who cultivate a part of 
their land themselves. This allows us also to compare land productivity of rented-out land and 
owner-operated land of the same landlords. A set of land quality variables is included to control 
for land quality.  
 
 
3. Theoretical models 
We refer to the transaction cost models for land rental markets in the introduction. The first 
model is with fixed-rent rental contracts and transaction costs in markets for land and nonland 
resources. The second model is with sharecropping contracts, moral hazard and tenure 
insecurity.  
3.1. Simple transaction costs model for the land rental market 
How can this model explain gendered productivity differentials? If female-headed households 
possess on average less nonland resources relative to land resources than male-headed 
households they are more likely to rent out land than male-headed households. They are 
therefore more likely to choose one of the first two land strategies. The transaction costs in the 
land rental market cause land productivity to be higher on rented-in land (managed by tenants) 
than on the owner-operated land of landlords. With a high proportion of the female-headed 
households in the category of landlord households (land strategy 2) and a low proportion of 
female-headed households in the tenant category of households (land strategy 4), land 
productivity of female-headed households should on average be lower than that of male-headed 
households. In this case the productivity on the land rented out by female-headed households 
should not be different from that on owner-operated land of tenant households. For pure owner-
operators (land strategy 3) average land productivity should fall between the average land 
productivity on owner-operated land of landlords and that of tenant households (rented-in as 
well as owner-operated land). 
Furthermore, if female-headed households face higher transaction costs in the land rental 
market, average land productivity on owner-operated land of female landlords should be lower 
than that of male landlords. This should also lead to female landlord households operating with 
lower nonland-land factor ratios on their owner-operated land.  
3.2. Model with sharecropping, transaction costs and tenant 
characteristics 
A landlord household has land endowment L  and rents out sL of this land with sL L≤ . The 
characteristics ( )lγ of the landlord household include nonland resources ( )lN  and sex of 
household head (g). The household expects to produce output q at price p using land and 
nonland resources in production. It is also assumed that sex of household head affects 
production in form of farm skill (non-tradable nonland resource) in a society where males 
traditionally are responsible for farming activities. Production is increasing in land and nonland 
resources use at a decreasing rate. Land and nonland resources are assumed to be 
complementary. Land is rented out in a sharecropping arrangement where the landlord gets 
α share of the expected output. This share is, for simplicity assumed to be fixed (exogenous) in 
the short run. Expected output on rented out land is a function of land rented out and the 
expected use of nonland resources by the tenant ( )0tN . The amount of nonland resources used 
by the tenant is expected to depend on his characteristics ( )tγ  and the sex of the head of the 
landlord household (g). We expect that 
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and enforcement capacity and there is no difference in endowments of tenants of male and 
female landlords’ tenants. We hypothesize that there is a higher risk of losing the land if it is 
rented out to the same tenant for more than one cropping season. This tenure insecurity ( )φ  is 
an increasing function of the share of the land that is rented out (
sL
L
) 2, and increasing with the 
number of years the land has been rented out to the same tenant ( )tC− , and is higher for female 
landlords than for male landlords. In case the landlord decides to evict the tenant that was 
contracted last year she/he will face an eviction cost and a search problem related to finding a 
new tenant and an uncertainty about the characteristics of the new tenant and his productivity 
because tenants’ characteristics are only partially observable. We assume that search efficiency 
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, they may be stuck with inefficient tenants. This may be in-laws or blod-
related kin that take control over their land. The landlord’s choice problem is stated in equation 
(3) below, assuming uniform land; 
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(3) 
She/he will not renew the contract if the first term (above) inside the big paranthesis is larger 
than the second term (below) inside the big paranthesis. 
  
We are particularly interested in studying the implications of the model for the difference 
between male and female landlords in terms of their exptected land productivity on own and 
rented out land. From the model we derive the following propositions, given that the 
productivity differential between male and female landlords persists after controlling for 
differences in plot quality, sample selection in relation to plots that are rented out, and other 
landlord characterisitcs; 
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 In the recent Ethiopian land proclamations it is stated that one may rent out up to half of the land, making it 
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1. Female landlords have less monitoring and enforcement capacity. They are therefore 
likely to experience more Marshallian inefficiency than male landlords. Contract choice 
therefore explains the productivity differential. 
2. Screening and search cost: Female landlords are less mobile due to more commitments 
at home and due to cultural restrictions. They are therefore less able to search and find 
good tenants. The productivity differential can therefore be explained by the difference 
in tenant characteristics of female and male landlords. 
3. Eviction cost: Female landlords are less able to evict inefficient tenants, particularly if 
these are blod-related kin or in-law tenants. The productivity differential is explained 
by the fact that female landlords have more blood-related kin and in-law tenants that 
are less efficient. 
4. Duration of partnership: Longer duration is a sign of tenure security and is associated 
with higher productivity for male landlords while it may be associated with less 
efficient kin contracts for female landlords.  
5. Pure landlords, renting out all their land, are less able to monitor and enforce contracts. 
Pure landlords are more likely to be female landlords and this explains the productivity 
differential. 
6. Tenure secure landlords may use threat of eviction to enhance the efficiency of tenants. 
Contract renewal conditional on performance is more used by male landlords that are 
more tenure secure than female landlords and this explains the productivity differential.  
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 can be contradictory. High eviction costs may be a sign of tenure 
insecurity and can lead to longer duration contracts.  
4. Methodology 
Empirical testing of gendered productivity differentials may reveal which of these propositions 
are true. We do this in several steps. The structure of the data is such that we have multiple 
plots per household. We cannot be sure that plot quality is the same on land for male and 
female landlords or that land quality and productivity are the same on owner-operated and 
rented out land. We use matching models and selection models to control for observable and 
unobservable plot characteristics. First we compared nonparametrically the land productivity 
on owner-operated and rented-out land of male and female landlords. We used propensity 
score plot matching to do this comparison. The propensity score was constructed on the basis 
of observable plot characteristics. We tested that the common support requirement was 
satisfied with our data and used kernel matching and nearest neighbour matching methods 
(Becker and Ichino, 2002, Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  
 
To control for selection bias related to unobservable plot characteristics we have applied 
selection models where the selection equation related to wheter plots were rented out or not 
(trade status hpT for household h and plot p.   
 ( )1    if    rented    out ,0 if owner-operatedhp hp hp hT T S Z
 
= = 
 
 (1.1) 
 
For identification we used observable plot characteristics ( )hpS , including soil type, distance to 
plot for landlords and plot size, and landlord household resource endowments ( )hZ  in form of 
male and female labour per unit owned land, oxen and other livestock per unit of land. Many of 
these variables were highly significant. We considered also using household fixed effects for 
the selection equation but the fact that a considerable share of the landlord households rented 
out all their land kept us from doing it. Following Deaton (1997) we used a polynomial of the 
predicted probability of a plot being traded in the selection equation to control for selection 
bias in the second stage productivity equations on rented out land. We were unable to use 
household fixed effects also in the second stage, unlike Shaban (Shaban, 1987), since we are 
interested in comparing land productivity of male and female landlord households, a household 
level variable. We used bootstrapping to get corrected standard errors in the second stage GLS 
models. 
Analytical strategy: 
1. Parametric approach: GLS selection models of land productivity on rented out plots of 
male and female landlords against the following variables; 
a. Plot characteristics (used in the propensity score matching), to control for plot 
quality variation,  
b. Gender dummy for sex of head of household, to see whether differences may be 
explained by other landlord household characteristics or whether the gender 
variable has a separate effect, 
c. Contract choice in terms of pure sharecropping as this type of contract is likely 
to have the largest disincentive effect as compared to fixed rent and costsharing 
contracts. Contract choice in terms of pure sharecropping is endogenous and is 
predicted. 
d. Nonland/land factor ratios and other characteristics of tenants, to see whether 
tenants’ characteristics alone can explain the productivity differential (meaning 
that male landlords are able to get better tenants)3.  
e. Duration of partnership with the same tenant which may not be the same as 
contract length because it may be a result of multiple renewals of short-term 
contracts (test whether significance of gender dummy disappears when this 
variable is added, this would indicate that land productivity on land rented out 
by male landlords is higher because they use more long-term contracts (perhaps 
because they are more tenure secure)) 
f. Interaction of landlord gender dummy with duration of partnership. This allows 
us to assess whether contract renewal and duration of partnership has a different 
effect on land productivity for female than for male landlords. 
g. Dummy for pure landlords (these are likely to be the weakest of the landlords, 
and are more likely to be female). They are more likely to have problems with 
monitoring and enforcing land use efficiency on their rented out land. This 
variable was used to replace the share of land rented out variable in the 
theoretical model. Different specifications were tried to test the hypothesis. 
 
7. Results and discussion 
 
We compared the land productivity of male and female landlords on all plots and on owner-
operated and rented out plots separately. We may then compare this with the propositions of 
the theoretical models and this may help us to reject some of the propositions. The results of 
this comparison are as follows in Table 4. 
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 We also do separate tests of whether there are significant differences in the tenant characteristics of male and 
female landlords (Table 6). Tenant characteristics are obviously endogenous so the results have to be interpreted 
with care. 
Table 4. Propensity score matching results of gender of household head on land 
productivity on owner-operated and rented out plots of landlord households1 
All plots Owner-operated plots Rented out plots Variable 
Kernel 
matching 
Nearest 
neighbour 
Kernel 
matching 
Nearest 
neighbour 
Kernel 
matching 
Nearest 
neighbour 
Land productivity       
 Female landlords 1366.02 1366.02 1430.85 1430.85 1345.05 1345.05 
 Male landlords 1806.08 1952.30 1799.02 2266.90 1815.49 1753.60 
Difference -440.06 -586.28 -368.16 -836.04 -470.44 -408.55 
Bootstrapped st. error 126.21 177.76 255.65 414.59 156.26 210.83 
t-statistic -3.487*** -3.298*** -1.440 -2.017** -3.011*** -1.938** 
Number of observations       
 Female landlords 439 439 124 124 315 315 
 Male landlords 820 477 329 153 484 255 
1 The comparison is based on propensity score kernel-based matching (Dehejia and Wahba 2002, Becker and 
Ichino 2003). Significance levels (after correction for bias): *: 10% level, **: 5% level, ***: 1% level. 
 
Table 4 reveals that average land productivity was significantly lower (1% level) for female 
landlords than for male landlords when we compare all their plots. When we compare land 
productivity separately for owner-operated plots, we see that this result is less robust as a 
significant difference is retained only when we used nearest neighbour matching. However, we 
find a significant difference with both matching methods on rented out plots.  
 
So where does this leave us with respect to the explanatory power of the theoretical models? 
This latter result that land productivity is lower on land rented out by female landlords than on 
land rented out by male landlords can clearly not be explained by our first theoretical 
transaction-cost model. This model predicted that land productivity should be higher on rented 
out plots than on owner-operated plots if we have transaction costs in the land rental market. 
We do not find this to be true in our empirical results. The other proposition of the first model 
was that land productivity should be lower on owner-operated plots of female landlords if they 
face higher transaction costs in the land rental market than male landlords. We find evidence 
on this but the results are not very robust as the productivity differential was significant only 
with the nearest neighbour matching method. This may also be due to the relatively smaller 
number of owner-operated plots that were owned by female landlords.  
 
We focus our analysis more on explaining the productivity differential on rented-out land. 
Does this differential mean that female landlords have more problems with Marshallian 
inefficiency on the rented out land while this is a less significant problem for male landlords? 
Table 4 does not reveal a larger gap in land productivity between owner-operated plots and 
rented out plots of female landlords than of male landlords that would be consistent with 
Marshallian inefficiency. The gap appears to be too small in both cases to be significant.  
 
In order to test more of our propositions from the second model we ran a number of parametric 
models on the rented out land. We corrected for plot selection bias with a plot trade selection 
model that is presented in Table 5 together with the results from the three first parametric 
productivity models.  
 
The first model (Landlord model 1) to explain productivity differentials on rented out plots is a 
village fixed effects (GLS) model with sample selection. This model does not take contract 
choice into account. We see from the trade selection equation in Table 5 that female landlords 
were more likely to rent out a specific plot. While controlling for plot, village, and other 
household characteristics, land productivity was still significantly lower on their rented out 
land. One may wonder why they rent out more land when they seem less able to enforce 
efficiency on their rented out land. We therefore wanted to test whether female landlords used 
pure sharecropping contracts more than male landlords and whether that could explain the 
productivity differential. Contract choice is endogenous and we predicted the probability that 
landlords chose pure sharecropping contracts over fixed-rent, cost-sharing and mixed contracts. 
The predicted variable (bpuresharp) was included in Landlord Model 2. We see from Table 5 
that the variable was significant at 5% level and with a negative sign while the gender variable 
(hsex) still remained significant. It appears therefore that there is more to the productivity 
differential than Marshallian inefficiency.  
 
Table 5. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Land Productivity Differentials 
on Rented Out Plots: With household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors 
                                           Trade selection 
Landlord Model 1  Landlord Model 2  Landlord Model 3           Equation          
                                       b/(se)                    b/(se)                       b/(se)                      b/(se)     
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Selection variables  
tradep             -2.912           -3.427           -3.611*                     
                   (2.19)           (2.11)           (2.04)                      
tradep2             2.745            3.326**          3.457**                    
                   (1.68)           (1.66)           (1.59)                      
Landlord household characteristics 
madultha                                                               0.106***  
                                                                      (0.04)     
fadultha                                                               0.157**   
                                                                      (0.07)     
fadultha2                                                             -0.011     
                                                                      (0.01)     
totalplot                                                              0.027**** 
                                                                      (0.01)     
extreme                                                                0.079     
                                                                      (0.36)     
severe                                                                 0.289     
                                                                      (0.18)     
intermediate                                                          -0.001     
                                                                      (0.36)     
security                                                              -0.152***  
                                                                      (0.05)     
confilct                                                               0.242**   
                                                                      (0.11)     
changeland                                                             0.111     
                                                                      (0.13)     
hage1                                                                 -0.002     
                                                                      (0.00)     
heduc1                                                                 0.077     
                                                                      (0.06)     
plotdist                                                               0.009**** 
                                                                      (0.00)     
oxha                                                                  -0.084**   
                                                                      (0.04)     
livestockha                                                            0.012     
                                                                      (0.01)     
hsex               -0.282**         -0.286**         -0.001            0.526**** 
                   (0.14)           (0.14)           (0.28)           (0.12)     
Predicted contract choice 
bpuresharp                          -2.093**         -1.718*                     
                                    (0.84)           (0.91)                      
puresharfp                                           -0.724                      
                                                     (0.60)                      
Plot characteristics 
soiltype1           0.246            0.270            0.273           -0.363***  
                   (0.17)           (0.19)           (0.18)           (0.14)     
soiltype2           0.137            0.174            0.180           -0.297**   
                   (0.17)           (0.18)           (0.18)           (0.13)     
slope1             -0.028           -0.070           -0.064            0.015     
                   (0.25)           (0.26)           (0.24)           (0.19)     
slope2              0.072            0.097            0.094            0.120     
                   (0.25)           (0.28)           (0.26)           (0.20)     
red                -0.045           -0.088           -0.098           -0.089     
                   (0.23)           (0.22)           (0.23)           (0.19)     
black              -0.234           -0.223           -0.239            0.097     
                   (0.23)           (0.20)           (0.22)           (0.19)     
plotarea           -4.389****       -3.763***        -3.721****        1.174**** 
                   (1.24)           (1.20)           (1.11)           (0.34)     
plotarea2           1.965            1.439            1.391                      
                   (1.43)           (1.37)           (1.33)                      
Village dummies 
amanuel            -0.858           -1.186*          -1.158**         -1.382**** 
                   (0.61)           (0.65)           (0.54)           (0.20)     
kebi               -0.138            0.112            0.121           -0.697**** 
                   (0.17)           (0.22)           (0.20)           (0.17)     
wolekie            -0.274           -0.455*          -0.450*          -0.410**   
                   (0.22)           (0.26)           (0.26)           (0.19)     
telima              0.029           -0.086           -0.058           -0.361*    
                   (0.33)           (0.37)           (0.35)           (0.19)     
sekeladebir        -0.678***        -0.140           -0.159            0.071     
                   (0.21)           (0.29)           (0.29)           (0.20)     
kete               -1.104****       -0.904****       -0.899****       -0.679**** 
                   (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.17)     
ambamariam         -1.088****       -0.434           -0.436            0.301     
                   (0.25)           (0.37)           (0.39)           (0.21)     
yamed              -0.528**          0.346            0.360           -0.155     
                   (0.25)           (0.41)           (0.37)           (0.19)     
addismender         0.106           -0.487           -0.483           -0.994**** 
                   (0.27)           (0.33)           (0.34)           (0.24)     
chorisa            -0.155                                             -0.462     
                   (0.42)                                             (0.30)     
Constant            8.869****        9.463****        9.377****        0.071     
                   (0.80)           (0.80)           (0.76)           (0.52)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
Number of obs.      605               591              591             1124    
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, **** 0.1%. 
 
We wanted to go one more step on this and created an interaction variable between the 
predicted pure sharecropping contract variable and the gender variable (hsex=1 for female 
landlords, zero otherwise). This variable would test whether Marshallian inefficiency is a 
problem only on land rented out by female landlords possibly due to their lower ability to 
monitor and enforce their contracts. This new variable (bpuresharfp) was added in the 
Landlord Model 3. We see from Table 5 that this variable also was insignificant although it had 
a negative sign. It appears therefore that female landlords are not significantly less able to 
enforce efficiency in relation to their pure sharecropping contracts. We see that the gender 
variable (hsex) became insignificant in this last model. The insignificance of these variabless 
could be due to multicollinearity because their standard errors increased.  
 
We now want to go further and test our hypotheses on screening and adverse selection of 
tenants as an explanation for the productivity differential. We had the following tenant 
characteristics related to each of the contracts; age of tenant, oxen ownership of tenant, 
whether the tenant was blod-related, and whether the tenant was in-law related to the landlord. 
The mean values of these variables and a test for significance of differences between male and 
female landlord households are presented in Table 6. The table reveals that female landlords 
had tenants that on average were significantly older and had fewer oxen than male landlords. 
This may be in line with our screening and adverse selection hypothesis, at least for the oxen 
variable, although it is less obvious that the age of tenants has a negative effect on land 
productivity. We also see from the table that female landlords were more likely to have blood-
related and in-law related tenants than male landlords were. However, we cannot be sure 
whether this implies a negative productivity effect due to screening/adverse selection of tenants 
till we have tested the effects on land productivity.  
The empirical evidence on how kinship contracts affect land contract efficiency are mixed 
(Kassie and Holden, 2006, Sadoulet , et al., 1997, Sadoulet, et al., 1997). Sadoulet et al.(1997) 
found that kinship contracts were more efficient while Kassie and Holden (2006) found kinship 
contracts to be less efficient. Since the study of Kassie and Holden was carried out in Ethiopia, 
it may have more relevance than that of Sadoulet et al. for our study area.  They proposed that 
threat of eviction may be used by landlords as an instrument to enhance land productivity on 
sharecropped out land while this instrument may not be so efficient in kin contracts as in non-
kin contracts. We have included duration of partnership (clength1) in our analysis to test 
whether duration of partnership with the tenant can be associated with land productivity. We 
refer to Bezabih and Holden (2006) for more details on the issue of contract length and 
contract renewal. We see from Table 6 that average contract duration was longer for female 
landlords than for male landlords even though land productivity was lower for female 
landlords. This may imply that female landlords were less able to use threat of eviction as a 
device to induce higher productivity and evict less efficient tenants. 
 
Table 6. Tenant characteristics of male and female landlord households 
Variable Female landlords 
Mean value 
Male landlords 
Mean value 
Bonferroni test of 
significant difference 
F               Prob > F 
Tanant age (tage)1 
 
2.368 2.232 4.73     0.0090 
Oxen owned by tenant  
(toxcd) 
1.940 2.075 2.99     0.0041 
Blod-related tenant  
(btenant) 
.466 .365 12.81    0.0004 
In-law related tenant 
(stenant) 
.184 .102 17.58    0.0000 
 
Contract length 
(clength1) 
4.825     2.637 9.17     0.0000 
 
1The age of tenants was grouped in three age categories; young, medium and old.  
We now go ahead and test for adverse selection effects on the productivity differential using 
parametric selection models. The results are presented in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Rented Out Land including 
Tenant Characteristics: with household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors 
 
Landlord-Tenant    Landlord-Tenant   Landlord-Tenant   Landlord-Tenant                                                  
Model 1         Model 2                   Model 3                   Model 4     
                     b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se 
Selection variables 
tradep             -3.571*          -3.632           -3.648*          -3.956     
                   (2.05)           (2.24)           (2.15)           (2.57)     
tradep2             3.435**          3.475**          3.463**          3.645*    
                   (1.56)           (1.75)           (1.67)           (1.99)     
Predicted contract choice                                                                                 
bpuresharp         -2.101***        -2.253***        -2.253***        -2.434***  
                   (0.81)           (0.87)           (0.85)           (0.86)     
Tenant characteristics 
hsex               -0.266*          -0.236*          -0.087           -0.004     
                   (0.14)           (0.14)           (0.15)           (0.24)     
tage                0.009            0.015           -0.012           -0.107     
                   (0.11)           (0.11)           (0.11)           (0.13)     
toxcd               0.018            0.024            0.043            0.057     
                   (0.08)           (0.07)           (0.08)           (0.09)     
btenant                              0.080                                       
                                    (0.12)                                       
stenant                             -0.297                                       
                                    (0.25)                                       
fbtenant                                             -0.092           -0.041     
                                                     (0.19)           (0.24)     
fstenant                                             -0.740**         -0.926**   
                                                     (0.37)           (0.42)     
clength1                                                               0.006     
                                                                      (0.03)     
fclength                                                              -0.027     
                                                                      (0.03)     
Plot characteristics 
soiltype1           0.286            0.254            0.241            0.129     
                   (0.20)           (0.20)           (0.19)           (0.22)     
soiltype2           0.185            0.169            0.135           -0.018     
                   (0.20)           (0.19)           (0.19)           (0.21)     
slope1             -0.081           -0.084           -0.065            0.038     
                   (0.24)           (0.26)           (0.26)           (0.29)     
slope2              0.105            0.087            0.122            0.337     
                   (0.25)           (0.28)           (0.26)           (0.26)     
red                -0.112           -0.116           -0.075           -0.044     
                   (0.24)           (0.23)           (0.23)           (0.26)     
black              -0.246           -0.262           -0.217           -0.143     
                   (0.23)           (0.23)           (0.22)           (0.25)     
plotarea           -3.820****       -3.885****       -3.938****       -4.880**** 
                   (1.14)           (1.09)           (1.06)           (1.12)     
plotarea2           1.489            1.556            1.619            2.916**   
                   (1.34)           (1.25)           (1.26)           (1.37)     
Village dummies 
amanuel            -1.283*          -1.349           -1.285           -1.267*    
                   (0.76)           (0.83)           (0.79)           (0.75)     
kebi                0.122            0.170            0.188            0.198     
                   (0.22)           (0.23)           (0.21)           (0.23)     
wolekie            -0.448           -0.450*          -0.382           -0.427     
                   (0.30)           (0.27)           (0.32)           (0.35)     
telima             -0.071           -0.080           -0.003            0.050     
                   (0.34)           (0.35)           (0.32)           (0.37)     
sekeladebir        -0.133           -0.092           -0.006            0.052     
                   (0.30)           (0.30)           (0.28)           (0.32)     
kete               -0.914****       -0.897****       -0.843****       -0.629**   
                   (0.25)           (0.24)           (0.24)           (0.29)     
ambamariam         -0.438           -0.383           -0.266           -0.252     
                   (0.40)           (0.42)           (0.41)           (0.52)     
yamed               0.350            0.416            0.576            0.847*    
                   (0.39)           (0.42)           (0.41)           (0.48)     
addismender        -0.501           -0.436           -0.262           -0.364     
                   (0.36)           (0.36)           (0.40)           (0.46)     
Constant            9.469****        9.537****        9.486****        9.860**** 
                   (0.84)           (0.84)           (0.85)           (0.96)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
Number of obs.      577              577              577              485   
________________________________________________________________ 
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, **** 0.1%. 
 
We see from Table 7 in the Landlord-Tenant Model 1 that the gender variable (hsex) remained 
significant after we included the tenant age (tage) and tenant oxen ownership (toxcd) variables 
while these variables were insignificant. The tenant variables are clearly endogenous so we 
have to interprete them with care.  
 
When we added the variables for blod-related tenants (btenant) and in-law related tenants 
(stenant) in Landlord-Tenant Model 2, these variables were also insignificant while the gender 
dummy variable remained significant. The size of the parameter for the gender dummy 
variable was reduced somewhat indicating that there may be a grain of truth in the adverse 
selection hypothesis, given the significant difference in these tenant characteristics between 
male and female landlords. 
  
We wanted to test more specifically whether kin contracts could be associated with lower 
productivity for female than for male landlords. We therefore constructed interaction variables 
between the blod-related tenant (fbtenant) and in-law tenant (fstenant) variables and the gender 
dummy variable. We present the results in Landlord-Tenant Model 3. We see that the 
interaction variable for blod-related tenants was insignificant while it was significant at 5% 
level and negative for in-law tenants. The parameter for the gender dummy variable became 
insignificant and the absolute value was much reduced. This indicates that in-law contracts are 
associated with the lower land productivity of female landlords’ rented out plots. In all the 
models the predicted contract choice (= pure sharecropping) remained significant at 1% level, 
showing the disincentive effect of sharecropping. 
 
We also wanted to control for duration of partnership (clength1) and included the interaction 
variable for contract length and gender (fclength) as well. We see from the Landlord-Tenant 
Model 4 that these variables also were insignificant and their inclusion did not affect any of the 
other variables of interest. It appears therefore that in-law tenants are less efficient than other 
tenants. Such contracts appear to be of longer duration even though they are less efficient (see 
Table 6). This is in line with anecdotal evidence that in-laws take control over land of female 
landlords. The female landlords may in such cases face high eviction costs and may therefore 
fail to evict these tenants and cannot search for more efficient tenants. This appears to be the 
main form of tenure insecurity that female landlords face. 
 
Finally, we wanted to assess whether pure landlords that are renting out all their land, were 
facing higher problems with inefficiency on their rented-out land, possibly because they may 
be more resource-poor or absent and therefore less able to monitor and enforce contracts, or 
because they may be more tenure insecure and therefore less able to use efficiency-enhancing 
devices. To test for this we included the dummy variable for pure landlords (llordpure), the 
predicted probability of being a pure landlord (purellp3) and an interaction variable for the 
predicted pure landlord variable and female dummy (purellpf). We included these variables 
one at the time and jointly because of possible problems with multicollinearity. We see the 
results in Table 8. None of the specifications made these variables significant. The signs were 
even positive in case of the interaction variable. Multicollinearity may therefore not be blamed 
for these varibles not being significant and with a negative sign. We therefore reject the 
hypothesis that lower productivity on rented out land from female landlords is due to their 
higher probability of being pure landlords.  
 
We did some further tests to see whether the difference could be associated with crop choice. 
First we tested whether the results were the same if we did the analysis for plots with cereals 
only. We found that was the case although levels of significance were reduced due to the 
smaller sample size (about 63% of the cropped plots were cropped with cereals). The 
equivalent results of Table 7 are presented in the appendix. Alternatively we also ran the 
regressions with a cereal dummy. Also this did not change the key results while the cereal 
dummy was significant and positive in most models (with about 20% higher output value than 
other plots). Crop choice is largely determined by local crop rotation practices and may 
therefore be seen as exogenous in our analysis (Kassie and Holden 2006). 
 
Table 8. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Rented Out Land including Tenant 
Characteristics: with household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors 
 
     Pure landlord          Pure landlord        Pure landlord     
           Model 1             Model 2                   Model 3                    
                     b/se             b/se             b/se              
   
Selection variables 
tradep             -4.035           -2.234           -2.169     
                   (2.46)           (2.39)           (2.61)     
tradep2             3.700*           2.402            2.149     
                   (1.93)           (1.84)           (2.02)     
Predicted contract choice    
bpuresharp         -2.369***        -2.389***        -2.611***  
                   (0.83)           (0.86)           (0.88)     
Pure landlord variables  
llordpure          -0.050                                       
                   (0.15)                                       
purellp3                            -0.628                      
                                    (0.64)                      
purellpf                             0.644            0.238     
                                    (0.70)           (0.51)     
Tenant characteristics 
hsex                0.011           -0.223           -0.115     
                   (0.24)           (0.36)           (0.32)     
tage               -0.106           -0.062           -0.062     
                   (0.12)           (0.12)           (0.11)     
toxcd               0.057            0.035            0.037     
                   (0.10)           (0.08)           (0.09)     
fbtenant           -0.045           -0.021           -0.015     
                   (0.21)           (0.23)           (0.22)     
fstenant           -0.927**         -0.862**         -0.874*    
                   (0.44)           (0.42)           (0.46)     
clength1            0.006           -0.003           -0.000     
                   (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)     
fclength           -0.027           -0.020           -0.024     
                   (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)     
Plot characteristics 
soiltype1           0.127            0.162            0.141     
                   (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.21)     
soiltype2          -0.024           -0.014           -0.018     
                   (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.23)     
slope1              0.038           -0.011           -0.007     
                   (0.30)           (0.29)           (0.31)     
slope2              0.333            0.286            0.293     
                   (0.32)           (0.28)           (0.32)     
red                -0.040           -0.107           -0.128     
                   (0.29)           (0.29)           (0.31)     
black              -0.136           -0.150           -0.158     
                   (0.28)           (0.27)           (0.30)     
plotarea           -4.877****       -4.861****       -4.835**** 
                   (1.10)           (1.19)           (1.30)     
plotarea2           2.911**          2.866**          2.934*    
                   (1.31)           (1.38)           (1.54)     
Village dummies 
amanuel            -1.292                                       
                   (0.81)                                       
kebi                0.171            0.092            0.229     
                   (0.24)           (0.27)           (0.24)     
wolekie            -0.424           -0.501           -0.513     
                   (0.37)           (0.34)           (0.37)     
telima              0.037           -0.088           -0.016     
                   (0.35)           (0.40)           (0.37)     
sekeladebir         0.028           -0.046            0.029     
                   (0.32)           (0.33)           (0.33)     
kete               -0.651**         -0.761**         -0.684**   
                   (0.31)           (0.33)           (0.29)     
ambamariam         -0.272           -0.325           -0.229     
                   (0.50)           (0.54)           (0.52)     
yamed               0.809*           0.688            0.828*    
                   (0.46)           (0.50)           (0.47)     
addismender        -0.375           -0.522           -0.482     
                   (0.49)           (0.48)           (0.53)     
Constant            9.889****        9.565****        9.509**** 
                   (0.96)           (0.94)           (1.02)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000     
Number of obs.     485              470              470          
Significance levels: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%, **** 0.1%. 
 
Our theoretical model captured the issue of eviction of tenants with the eviction cost, which is 
like a transaction cost that may lock these female landlords into a continued contract 
relationship. This may also be seen as involuntary contract participation and is related to the 
weak property rights and weak farmer status of female-headed households. However, we think 
our second model capturing transaction costs related to eviction and screening and search for 
tenants provides an adequate theoretical framework for the problem we analyse and that it is 
consistent with a contested exchange model (Bowles and Gintis 1988; Bowles and Gintis 
1993). The eviction costs are real and a consequence of the power structure similar to 
transaction costs and asymmetric information causing involuntary non-participation in other 
markets. While male landlords may be on what Bowles and Gintis (1998, 1993) call the short 
side of a non-clearing market and therefore in a powerful position that allows them to use 
eviction threats, it is likely that female landlords whose land is rented in by blod-related kin or 
in-law tenants have much less bargaining power. They may therefore not be called short-siders 
and are therefore also less able to capture the resource rents.  
6. Conclusion 
We have tested alternative models and theories to explain the productivity differential on 
rented out plots of female vs. male landlord households in the Ethiopian highlands. A simple 
transaction cost model could not explain the differential. The hypothesis of endogenous 
contract choice and higher Marshallian inefficiency in the case of female landlords also could 
not explain the whole productivity differential although the variable was highly significant. We 
found significantly higher level of inefficiency linked to contracts of female landlords with in-
law tenants. This may be due to the high eviction costs of tenure insecure female landlords who 
therefore are less able to freely screen and select the better tenants. Female landlords face 
higher tenure insecurity and have lower bargaining power. This leads to poorer screening and 
selection ability, poorer quality tenants and lower resource rents.  
 
An important policy implication of our analysis is that strengthening women’s land rights may 
not only be good for equity but also for efficiency of land use. The new land proclamations in 
Ethiopia push in this direction but it may take quite some time and additional effort in terms of 
information dissemination and sensitisation to reduce the gender biases that are deeply rooted 
in the culture. Local administrations including local courts as well as NGOs have to play 
important roles in this process. Donor support may be important to provide sufficient resources 
for this.  
 
A large share of the landlord households, and even a larger share of the female landlords in the 
sample violated the new regulation that only up to half of the land owned can be rented out. If 
this regulation is implemented strongly, it will contribute to more tenure insecurity for the 
poorest landlords that often are female-headed households. This regulation appears neither to 
contribute to enhance efficiency nor equity as it hits the poorest of the poor. It reduces the 
possibility of using land as a safety net.  
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Figure 1. Duration of partnership for male and female landlord households 
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Figure 2. Share of land rented out by male and female landlord households. 
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Figure 3. Share of land rented out to non-kin and to kin tenants 
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Figure 4. Share of land rented out to non-in-law and to in-law tenants 
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Figure 5. Land productivity distribution (log of output value) of land rented out to non-kin 
and to kin tenants. 
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Figure 6. Land productivity distribution (log output value) of land of male and female 
landlord households. 
Appendix. 
Table A1. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Rented Out Land including 
Tenant Characteristics: With household random effects and bootstrapped standard 
errors 
Analysis for plots with cereal crops only 
 
Landlord-Tenant       Landlord-Tenant     Landlord-Tenant    Landlord-Tenant                                                              
Model 1                        Model 2                   Model 3                   Model 4     
                     b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se 
tradep             -0.740           -0.838           -0.695           -0.652     
                   (1.97)           (1.89)           (1.93)           (1.99)     
tradep2             1.012            1.140            0.958            0.835     
                   (1.40)           (1.37)           (1.44)           (1.50)     
hsex               -0.296*          -0.268*          -0.119           -0.019     
                   (0.16)           (0.15)           (0.18)           (0.27)     
bpuresharp         -1.161**         -1.321***        -1.272***        -1.341***  
                   (0.50)           (0.46)           (0.48)           (0.52)     
tage                0.052            0.072            0.026           -0.040     
                   (0.10)           (0.10)           (0.11)           (0.12)     
toxcd              -0.025           -0.012            0.011            0.003     
                   (0.07)           (0.07)           (0.09)           (0.10)     
soiltype1           0.245            0.198            0.188            0.011     
                   (0.21)           (0.21)           (0.20)           (0.22)     
soiltype2           0.139            0.125            0.073           -0.095     
                   (0.19)           (0.20)           (0.18)           (0.21)     
slope1             -0.166           -0.166           -0.161            0.048     
                   (0.27)           (0.25)           (0.26)           (0.37)     
slope2             -0.098           -0.128           -0.086            0.141     
                   (0.27)           (0.25)           (0.25)           (0.36)     
red                -0.221           -0.233           -0.172           -0.019     
                   (0.25)           (0.26)           (0.23)           (0.26)     
black              -0.132           -0.168           -0.096            0.123     
                   (0.24)           (0.25)           (0.23)           (0.25)     
plotarea           -4.099***        -4.198****       -4.316****       -5.466**** 
                   (1.27)           (1.20)           (1.09)           (1.36)     
plotarea2           1.737            1.821            1.953            3.471**   
                   (1.39)           (1.30)           (1.23)           (1.64)     
amanuel            -0.075           -0.166           -0.060            0.009     
                   (0.54)           (0.58)           (0.58)           (0.58)     
kebi               -0.029           -0.000            0.032            0.067     
                   (0.19)           (0.20)           (0.19)           (0.20)     
wolekie             0.051            0.018            0.153            0.314     
                   (0.26)           (0.28)           (0.28)           (0.33)     
telima             -0.136           -0.179           -0.084           -0.021     
                   (0.29)           (0.33)           (0.31)           (0.38)     
sekeladebir        -0.439*          -0.431           -0.319           -0.184     
                   (0.25)           (0.27)           (0.26)           (0.25)     
kete               -1.278****       -1.244****       -1.189****       -1.001***  
                   (0.24)           (0.24)           (0.26)           (0.31)     
ambamariam         -1.367****       -1.348****       -1.193****       -1.163**   
                   (0.35)           (0.37)           (0.35)           (0.53)     
yamed              -0.564           -0.513           -0.280           -0.161     
                   (0.37)           (0.42)           (0.40)           (0.41)     
addismender        -0.450           -0.360           -0.133           -0.221     
                   (0.33)           (0.39)           (0.41)           (0.53)     
btenant                              0.191                                       
                                    (0.14)                                       
stenant                             -0.297                                       
                                    (0.28)                                       
fbtenant                                             -0.029           -0.103     
                                                     (0.21)           (0.24)     
fstenant                                             -0.835*          -0.947*    
                                                     (0.43)           (0.56)     
clength1                                                               0.013     
                                                                      (0.02)     
fclength                                                              -0.021     
                                                                      (0.04)     
Constant            8.863****        8.870****        8.837****        8.867**** 
                   (0.81)           (0.83)           (0.84)           (0.92)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
Numbe..           367.000          367.000          367.000          314.000     
Table A2. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Land Productivity Differentials 
on Rented Out Plots: With household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors: 
With crop dummy for cereals 
 
                           Trade selection 
        Equation      Landlord Model 1  Landlord Model 2  Landlord Model 3                  
                                       b/(se)                    b/(se)                       b/(se)                      b/(se)     
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
hsex                0.526****       -0.280**         -0.278**         -0.003     
                   (0.12)           (0.13)           (0.13)           (0.27)     
madultha            0.106***                                                     
                   (0.04)                                                        
fadultha            0.157**                                                      
                   (0.07)                                                        
fadultha2          -0.011                                                        
                   (0.01)                                                        
totalplot           0.027****                                                    
                   (0.01)                                                        
extreme             0.079                                                        
                   (0.36)                                                        
severe              0.289                                                        
                   (0.18)                                                        
intermediate       -0.001                                                        
                   (0.36)                                                        
security           -0.152***                                                     
                   (0.05)                                                        
confilct            0.242**                                                      
                   (0.11)                                                        
changeland          0.111                                                        
                   (0.13)                                                        
hage1              -0.002                                                        
                   (0.00)                                                        
heduc1              0.077                                                        
                   (0.06)                                                        
soiltype1          -0.363***         0.248            0.273            0.276     
                   (0.14)           (0.17)           (0.20)           (0.17)     
soiltype2          -0.297**          0.138            0.178            0.183     
                   (0.13)           (0.16)           (0.17)           (0.17)     
red                -0.089           -0.098           -0.145           -0.154     
                   (0.19)           (0.21)           (0.24)           (0.23)     
slope1              0.015           -0.018           -0.062           -0.056     
                   (0.19)           (0.21)           (0.24)           (0.24)     
slope2              0.120            0.069            0.092            0.089     
                   (0.20)           (0.23)           (0.24)           (0.25)     
black               0.097           -0.282           -0.273           -0.289     
                   (0.19)           (0.20)           (0.23)           (0.23)     
plotarea            1.174****       -4.407****       -3.796****       -3.757**** 
                   (0.34)           (1.08)           (0.98)           (0.97)     
plotdist            0.009****                                                    
                   (0.00)                                                        
oxha               -0.084**                                                      
                   (0.04)                                                        
livestockha         0.012                                                        
                   (0.01)                                                        
amanuel            -1.382****       -0.806           -1.143*          -1.116*    
                   (0.20)           (0.55)           (0.61)           (0.58)     
kebi               -0.697****       -0.151            0.110            0.119     
                   (0.17)           (0.18)           (0.20)           (0.20)     
wolekie            -0.410**         -0.204           -0.393           -0.388     
                   (0.19)           (0.24)           (0.26)           (0.26)     
telima             -0.361*           0.029           -0.092           -0.064     
                   (0.19)           (0.31)           (0.35)           (0.32)     
sekeladebir         0.071           -0.672****       -0.110           -0.128     
                   (0.20)           (0.20)           (0.29)           (0.29)     
kete               -0.679****       -1.127****       -0.922****       -0.917**** 
                   (0.17)           (0.22)           (0.22)           (0.22)     
ambamariam          0.301           -1.047****       -0.370           -0.372     
                   (0.21)           (0.27)           (0.36)           (0.37)     
yamed              -0.155           -0.485*           0.420            0.433     
                   (0.19)           (0.29)           (0.38)           (0.40)     
addismender        -0.994****        0.050           -0.566           -0.562*    
                   (0.24)           (0.25)           (0.35)           (0.33)     
chorisa            -0.462           -0.204                                       
                   (0.30)           (0.39)                                       
tradep                              -2.970           -3.460*          -3.639*    
                                    (1.93)           (2.07)           (2.06)     
tradep2                              2.772*           3.339**          3.467**   
                                    (1.51)           (1.60)           (1.57)     
cropdum                              0.205**          0.204**          0.202**   
                                    (0.09)           (0.10)           (0.10)     
plotarea2                            1.932            1.418            1.373     
                                    (1.21)           (1.15)           (1.10)     
bpuresharp                                           -2.175***        -1.813**   
                                                     (0.84)           (0.92)     
puresharfp                                                            -0.700     
                                                                      (0.60)     
Constant            0.071            8.799****        9.413****        9.331**** 
                   (0.52)           (0.65)           (0.83)           (0.80)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
Numbe..          1124.000          605.000          591.000          591.000     
 
Table A3. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Rented Out Land including 
Tenant Characteristics: With household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors 
Analysis for plots with cereal crops only 
 
Landlord-Tenant    Landlord-Tenant   Landlord-Tenant   Landlord-Tenant                                                  
Model 1         Model 2                   Model 3                   Model 4     
                     b/se             b/se             b/se             b/se 
tradep             -3.542           -3.605           -3.599*          -3.928*    
                   (2.21)           (2.27)           (2.11)           (2.30)     
tradep2             3.400**          3.442**          3.411**          3.616*    
                   (1.66)           (1.73)           (1.61)           (1.85)     
hsex               -0.258*          -0.227           -0.093           -0.002     
                   (0.14)           (0.14)           (0.16)           (0.23)     
bpuresharp         -2.178***        -2.346***        -2.350***        -2.499***  
                   (0.80)           (0.86)           (0.82)           (0.81)     
cropdum             0.203**          0.211**          0.212**          0.208*    
                   (0.09)           (0.10)           (0.10)           (0.11)     
tage                0.010            0.017           -0.009           -0.105     
                   (0.11)           (0.11)           (0.12)           (0.11)     
toxcd               0.011            0.018            0.037            0.051     
                   (0.06)           (0.07)           (0.08)           (0.08)     
soiltype1           0.290            0.256            0.242            0.119     
                   (0.19)           (0.19)           (0.20)           (0.19)     
soiltype2           0.190            0.173            0.138           -0.027     
                   (0.20)           (0.18)           (0.19)           (0.19)     
slope1             -0.077           -0.080           -0.062            0.035     
                   (0.26)           (0.26)           (0.25)           (0.30)     
slope2              0.093            0.073            0.108            0.319     
                   (0.26)           (0.27)           (0.25)           (0.32)     
red                -0.164           -0.171           -0.128           -0.066     
                   (0.24)           (0.24)           (0.23)           (0.27)     
black              -0.292           -0.312           -0.264           -0.170     
                   (0.22)           (0.21)           (0.22)           (0.27)     
plotarea           -3.856****       -3.923****       -3.975****       -4.911**** 
                   (0.90)           (1.07)           (0.98)           (1.17)     
plotarea2           1.472            1.538            1.601            2.901**   
                   (1.02)           (1.22)           (1.14)           (1.42)     
amanuel            -1.225           -1.294           -1.234           -1.201     
                   (0.83)           (0.80)           (0.86)           (0.78)     
kebi                0.118            0.167            0.183            0.197     
                   (0.20)           (0.22)           (0.21)           (0.21)     
wolekie            -0.394           -0.398           -0.329           -0.355     
                   (0.30)           (0.32)           (0.29)           (0.36)     
telima             -0.082           -0.095           -0.020            0.029     
                   (0.32)           (0.34)           (0.30)           (0.34)     
sekeladebir        -0.109           -0.065            0.021            0.086     
                   (0.29)           (0.29)           (0.29)           (0.27)     
kete               -0.935****       -0.919****       -0.859****       -0.634**   
                   (0.27)           (0.25)           (0.25)           (0.29)     
ambamariam         -0.380           -0.320           -0.201           -0.171     
                   (0.38)           (0.41)           (0.41)           (0.48)     
yamed               0.413            0.485            0.645            0.910**   
                   (0.41)           (0.40)           (0.40)           (0.43)     
addismender        -0.578           -0.515           -0.342           -0.413     
                   (0.37)           (0.36)           (0.39)           (0.45)     
btenant                              0.090                                       
                                    (0.14)                                       
stenant                             -0.308                                       
                                    (0.23)                                       
fbtenant                                             -0.056           -0.020     
                                                     (0.19)           (0.23)     
fstenant                                             -0.746**         -0.944**   
                                                     (0.36)           (0.40)     
clength1                                                               0.005     
                                                                      (0.03)     
fclength                                                              -0.026     
                                                                      (0.03)     
Constant            9.412****        9.480****        9.422****        9.775**** 
                   (0.85)           (0.90)           (0.84)           (0.81)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000            0.000     
Numbe..           577.000          577.000          577.000          485.000 
 
Table A4. Generalised Least Squares Selection Models for Rented Out Land including 
Tenant Characteristics: with household random effects and bootstrapped standard errors, 
With crop dummy for cereals 
 
     Pure landlord          Pure landlord        Pure landlord     
           Model 1             Model 2                   Model 3                    
                     b/se             b/se             b/se              
tradep             -4.024*          -2.209           -2.141     
                   (2.32)           (2.32)           (2.51)     
tradep2             3.682**          2.423            2.145     
                   (1.84)           (1.87)           (1.93)     
hsex                0.015           -0.222           -0.101     
                   (0.23)           (0.34)           (0.30)     
bpuresharp         -2.424***        -2.418***        -2.662***  
                   (0.76)           (0.83)           (0.82)     
llordpure          -0.059                                       
                   (0.17)                                       
cropdum             0.209**          0.171            0.166     
                   (0.10)           (0.11)           (0.11)     
tage               -0.104           -0.061           -0.061     
                   (0.11)           (0.12)           (0.10)     
toxcd               0.051            0.031            0.033     
                   (0.08)           (0.08)           (0.09)     
fbtenant           -0.024           -0.004            0.002     
                   (0.24)           (0.20)           (0.22)     
fstenant           -0.945**         -0.878**         -0.892**   
                   (0.45)           (0.42)           (0.41)     
clength1            0.005           -0.004           -0.001     
                   (0.02)           (0.02)           (0.03)     
fclength           -0.026           -0.019           -0.023     
                   (0.03)           (0.03)           (0.03)     
soiltype1           0.116            0.159            0.136     
                   (0.23)           (0.21)           (0.20)     
soiltype2          -0.035           -0.017           -0.021     
                   (0.21)           (0.21)           (0.21)     
slope1              0.033           -0.003            0.001     
                   (0.29)           (0.32)           (0.31)     
slope2              0.314            0.276            0.284     
                   (0.30)           (0.33)           (0.31)     
red                -0.062           -0.123           -0.146     
                   (0.28)           (0.26)           (0.27)     
black              -0.162           -0.175           -0.182     
                   (0.27)           (0.27)           (0.26)     
plotarea           -4.908****       -4.927****       -4.896**** 
                   (1.14)           (1.17)           (1.13)     
plotarea2           2.894**          2.876**          2.951**   
                   (1.38)           (1.37)           (1.42)     
amanuel            -1.231                                       
                   (0.77)                                       
kebi                0.165            0.081            0.231     
                   (0.23)           (0.28)           (0.23)     
wolekie            -0.351           -0.432           -0.447     
                   (0.35)           (0.34)           (0.34)     
telima              0.013           -0.107           -0.027     
                   (0.40)           (0.38)           (0.36)     
sekeladebir         0.058           -0.022            0.060     
                   (0.30)           (0.32)           (0.31)     
kete               -0.660**         -0.770***        -0.685**   
                   (0.30)           (0.29)           (0.31)     
ambamariam         -0.195           -0.271           -0.167     
                   (0.48)           (0.54)           (0.47)     
yamed               0.866**          0.722            0.875**   
                   (0.43)           (0.45)           (0.43)     
addismender        -0.427           -0.562           -0.517     
                   (0.47)           (0.51)           (0.49)     
purellp3                            -0.695                      
                                    (0.60)                      
purellpf                             0.653            0.203     
                                    (0.67)           (0.49)     
Constant            9.810****        9.480****        9.421**** 
                   (0.85)           (0.91)           (0.96)     
Prob > chi2         0.000            0.000            0.000     
Numbe..           485.000          470.000          470.000     
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